Prophet of Innovation
In Joseph A. Schumpeter's (1883 Schumpeter's ( -1950 encyclopedic History of Economic Analysis, Schumpeter began by proclaiming that histories of economics should confine themselves to economic analysis, which he defined as "the analytic or scientific aspects of economic thought" (1954: 1). Schumpeter then proceeded to ignore his own edict, for over 1000 small-print pages.
Having preached analysis-only Schumpeter practiced more ecumenically, weaving together intellectual history, biography, and economic sociology. Indeed, Schumpeter spent most of his last decade writing the 800,000 words of the ferociously erudite History, and thereby failing to complete a long-planned work of economic analysis. Schumpeter's second wife Annie died in childbirth, and the child died as well. Schumpeter's beloved mother died in the same year, a three-fold emotional wounding from which Schumpeter, then 42, never fully recovered. Ahead still lay the Great Depression and another murderous war in Europe, which Schumpeter was presciently predicting as early as 1928. "Here was a rarity," Daniel Bell said of Schumpeter, "an economist with a tragic sense of life" (485).
In political economy, the tragedy is a genre of the growth story, which is to be contrasted with the equilibrium story. All equilibrium narratives end in the same place. In equilibrium.
There's no role for a hero, tragic or other. Even the true protagonist, the Walrasian Auctioneer, is hidden away, unexplained. Growth stories, in contrast, are more open-ended, uncertain, and path-dependant. In growth stories, history matters. Even tragedies, which also end predictably, must tell the beginning first. Thus do political economy's best-known growth stories provide a hero.
Adam Smith's hero was the prudent man. Commercial society depends upon the prudent man, who behaves virtuously even when it is in his material interest to do otherwise. The prudent man's virtues (frugality, foresight, self-control) are of the small-bore, bourgeois variety, but without them, the invisible hand cannot perform its magic.
Marx, too, wrote in the growth genre. So, even Marx's determinism -wherein capitalism necessarily seeds its own destruction -found room for a hero: the radical intellectual. Never mind that the death of capitalism was preordained: it is the radical intellectual who can pierce the veil of his false consciousness to correctly see the truth of historical inevitability, and it is the radical intellectual who can lead the vanguard of proletarian revolt.
For John Maynard Keynes, the hero was the economist qua expert (or, as per Robert Skidelsky, The Economist as Savior). The hero economist sees the folly of crushing war reparations, and the error of Say's Law, and urges upon the powerful a new law --that prudent monetary and fiscal stimulus can restore traction to aggregate demand temporarily mired in a liquidity trap. An enlightened government, which is to say, one prepared to receive tuition from its technocratic betters, can thereby save capitalism from itself. The expert-guided government can reign in capitalism's destructive tendencies sufficient to realize the ongoing benefits of its awesome productive powers.
Keynes, Schumpeter's exact contemporary, was his great rival. Schumpeter admired and envied Keynes, but when Keynes died in 1946, Schumpeter's obituary gave Keynes the same off-key, perfunctory treatment he would later give Adam Smith in the History of Economic Analysis, the "discredit of not adding a single innovation to the techniques of economic analysis" (466).
Schumpeter was not averse to Keynes' economist-as-hero construct. This was a man who liked to say he had aspired to become the world's greatest economist, lover and horseman. Alas, said Schumpeter, pausing for effect, things hadn't worked out so well with the horses. But Schumpeter thought that Keynes' stagnationist ideology provided intellectual cover to those far more hostile to capitalism than he, and, moreover, that Keynes' emphasis on the short run invited trouble from governments naturally inclined to profligacy and incompetence. It was naïve, His very first paper was a call for mathematics in political economy, and he was a co-founder of the Econometric Society. No mathematician himself, he incessantly urged mathematical training upon his students and junior colleagues. But Schumpeter believed that economics, especially when its claims were made the basis for policy, required more. Tempting though it was to succumb to the elegance of a story constructed of only a few well-chosen variables, Schumpeter, ever rigorous, argued that a fully realized policy science needed insights from history, sociology, politics, even philosophy.
Schumpeter's hero, of course, was the entrepreneur, "the agent of innovation," and, Schumpeter said, "the pivot on which everything turns" (7). Schumpeter's now famous theory of entrepreneurship was developed first in his pioneering Theory of Economic Development (1911), a precocious scholar's attempt to understand the evolution of economies, written during his early academic years, at the University of Czernowitz.
Capitalist economies go up and down. So much would have been evident to any observer who had lived through the business-cycle volatility of the 1890s. But, Schumpeter said, capitalist economics also grow over time, cycles notwithstanding. In the short run, there are ups and downs; but, in the long run, there is growth.
Only 28 years old, the young Schumpeter judged Walrasian-style equilibrium analysis, which he admired, as empirically inadequate --too irreducibly static to explain economic growth. Equilibrium analysis' passive, price-taking agents, and its implication of continual economic stationarity were at odds with observable real-world business behavior, and with the continual process of disruptive change so evident in real economies. What was needed, he said, was a theory that could explain the dynamism of capitalist economies, and its effects upon growth and business cycles. Schumpeter found his answer in the entrepreneur and his function, innovation. Entrepreneurial innovation propels capitalist economies upward, albeit along a very bumpy track.
The entrepreneur, however, was mostly missing from Anglophone economics, which had [I]n capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [textbook] . . . competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the largest-scale unit of control for instance)-competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives (1950: 82).
Innovation, that is, propels the capitalist economy with "gales of creative destruction," the memorable phrase that Schumpeter borrowed from Werner Sombart.
Schumpeter vividly characterized innovation as "industrial mutation," which "incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. Schumpeter's reply was the ponderous, unlovely Business Cycles (1939), a monumentally ambitious two-volume book that attempted nothing less than a history of capitalist processes, and that moreover, attempted to model business cycles as the product of interacting medium (40 months), long (8-10 years) and very long (50-60 years) wave cycles. Schumpeter's desire for an exact economics led him to abandon the uncertainty and complexity of "irregularly regular" for the false precision of three-cycle wave theory. Paul Samuelson said that the book "smacked of Pythagorean moonshine" (253).
Other reviewers were kinder, but the general reception of Business Cycles was tepid, not least because Keynes' General Theory had been published three years prior, and was on its way to becoming a runaway success. McCraw tells of the 1939 Harvard seminar organized by Schumpeter's students to discuss Business Cycles. It quickly became clear that no one had read the book, and all anyone talked about was Keynes. Schumpeter, shamed, reacted with a fury he rarely revealed publicly.
McCraw reads Business Cycles as an inflection point in Schumpeter's intellectual life: it was the last time Schumpeter attempted to join economic history and economic theory -the turning point "in Schumpeter's decades-long intellectual wrestling match with himself" (271).
Schumpeter still believed deeply that "economic historians and economic theorists can make an important and socially valuable journey together, if they will" (475). But, in Schumpeter's remaining decade, and in his own work, increasingly, they would not. This is no accident. Schumpeterian subjects -innovation, entrepreneurship, business strategy -form the very heart of business school curricula. And Schumpeterian ideas remain influential, fifty-eight years after his death, in departments of politics, sociology and history (497). But they are mostly ignored in Economics departments, in large part because they have proven too difficult to formalize -to fit into the maximization cum equilibrium method that still defines academic economics (500). 1 Schumpeter, his friend and colleague Gottfried Haberler (1950) said, was a great economist because he was so much more than just an economist. Schumpeter's polymathic breadth made his own work extremely difficult to describe, Haberler said, but Thomas McCraw has described it. Fittingly, Prophet of Innovation manages the Schumpeterian feat of synthesizing history, economics and biography, all of which were needed to produce this fully realized, beautifully drawn portrait of a complex man, and of his great subject, capitalism --its economics, its social institutions, and, first among equals, its historical record.
McCraw suggests that the failure of
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